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Abstract
The use and eventual demise of military parole in the American Civil War provides a 
key insight into the changing nature of ‘military honour’ in America’s bloodiest 
conflict. This thesis will use parole to examine America’s engagement and dedication 
to European international law, the prevalence of ‘honour’ in Union and Confederate 
armies and the way a pre-war culture of honour was challenged both by the harsh 
realities of nineteenth-century warfare and by the uniquely American way parole was 
employed during the Civil War. 
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INTRODUCTION
 
 In April 1861, in San Antonio, Texas, the first prisoners of war (POWs) of the 
American Civil War were captured. In a confused and heated confrontation, Captain 
Wilcox of the newly declared Confederate States of America entered the office of Federal 
Colonel Waite and informed him that  he and all his men were now POWs of the 
Confederacy.1  Colonel Waite was naturally indignant and protested that the Confederate 
Captain’s actions were a “violation of the modes and customs of civilized warfare.”2 
Nonetheless, Waite conceded to be taken to Major Maclin, the man who issued the order, 
when it was revealed that Wilcox commanded thirty-six Texas troops “armed with rifles 
and saber bayonets.”3  On the authority of the “President of the Confederate States”, an 
authority Waite claimed “I do not know, nor shall I obey”, Maclin gave the Union prisoners 
a choice: they could sign a parole of honour not to fight against the Confederacy  or be held 
in confinement until exchanged.4  After twenty-four hours to consider the situation, the 
officers gave their word of honour and the soldiers gave their oath not to take up arms or 
pursue any course of action detrimental to the Confederate States of America—a 
Government whose authority they did not recognise but were now honour bound to 
respect.5 
 
5
1  United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies, Series 2, Volume 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office,  1894), p. 45; 
Cited hereafter as the Official Records with ‘OR’. 
2 OR, Series 2, Volume 1, p. 45. 
3 OR, Series 2, Volume 1, p. 45. 
4 OR, Series 2, Volume 1, p. 46. 
5 OR, Series 2, Volume 1, p. 48. 
 Despite the confused scene at San Antonio, military  parole in the American Civil War 
(1861-1865) became a common way of dealing with POWs between the years 1861-1863. 
A product of eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century  European international law, the 
practice essentially  entailed an officer, captured by the enemy, giving his word of honour 
that he would not fight or take any actions against the opposing army or government. 
Instead of being confined in a prison camp at  the captor government’s expense, the paroled 
officer was at liberty to return home, or was given partial freedom within a designated 
area.6  The parole system was part of the broader attempt from the seventeenth century 
onwards, to legitimise warfare by limiting gratuitous violence.7  When two belligerent 
sovereign states found themselves at  war, practices such as parole highlighted the 
‘civilised’ character of their army, and as influential Swiss jurist  Emmerich de Vattel put it, 
the “honour and humanity” of the nation.8
 In previous scholarship on POW practices during the American Civil War it is 
generally  taken for granted that  both the Union and Confederate forces employed parole. 
Greater emphasis is placed on the Civil War prisons themselves, where men, for political 
or military reasons, were not offered parole and were consequently confined at the expense 
of the captor’s government.9  Historian William Best Hesseltine’s seminal work, Civil War 
Prisons: A Study of War Psychology, for example, does address the practice of parole but 
within the broader narrative of what led to the dire conditions of the Civil War prison 
6
6  Gavin Daly, ‘Napoleon’s Lost Legions: French Prisoners of War in Britain, 1803-1814’, History, vol. 89, 
issue 295 (June 2004), p. 366; Sibylle Scheipers, ‘Introduction’, in Sibylle Scheipers (ed.), Prisoners in War 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 4-5.  
7 John A. Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2004), p. 133. 
8  Emmerich de Vattel and Joseph Chittey, trans., The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature, 
Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns (Philadelphia: T. & J.W. Johnson, Law 
Booksellers, 1852), p. 354. 
9 William Best Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons: A Study of War Psychology (Columbus: Ohio State University 
Press, 1998), pp. 10-11; Also see: Alfred Ely, Journal of Alfred Ely: A Prisoner of War in Richmond (New 
York: D. Appleton and Company, 1862). 
camps.10 As historian Benjamin G. Cloyd argues, since the conclusion of the conflict, both 
historians and the American public have been embroiled in a blame-game over which side 
was responsible for the deterioration of the Civil War prison system. In 1863 prisoner 
exchange and parole broke down resulting in the long term confinement of both Union and 
Confederate soldiers in over crowded, disease ridden and poorly rationed prison camps.11 
By the end of the war, 56,000 soldiers had perished in confinement.12  The fate of these 
unfortunate soldiers has caused controversy over the morality  and righteousness of both 
side’s cause ever since.13
 This thesis argues that the practice of parole, though part of the broader Civil War 
POW system, should be examined in its own right. The American Civil War was the last 
western conflict where paroles were regularly employed and honoured by both armies.14 
7
10 Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons, pp. 34 & 92-99. 
11 For an account of the harsh conditions of POW camps, see: Robert S.  Daivs, ‘Escape from Andersonville: 
A Study in Isolation and Imprisonment’, The Journal of Military History, vol. 67, no. 4 (October 2003), pp. 
1065-1081.  
12  Benjamin G. Cloyd, Haunted by Atrocity: Civil War Prisons in American Memory (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana University Press, 2010), p. 1. 
13  Cloyd, Haunted by Atrocity, p. 3. These debates are still evident in recent scholarship: Jesse Waggoner, 
‘The Role of the Physician: Eugene Sanger and a Standard of Care at the Elmira Prison Camp’, Journal of 
the History of Medicine and Allied Science, vol. 63, no. 1 (January 2008) suggests that the North is morally 
more culpable for the poor treatment of Civil War prisoners than the South, as the Union had both the means 
and the wealth to ensure adequate care. The Confederacy, on the other hand, was severely constrained by a 
lack of money and men. pp. 3-9; Robert S. Davis, ‘Escape from Andersonville: A Study in Isolation and 
Imprisonment’, claims that the Georgia prison camp, Andersonville, “became the world’s first great 
concentration camp” - language that undoubtedly calls to mind the horrors of the Second World War. p. 1065; 
James M. Gillispie,  Andersonvilles of the North: The Myths and Realities of Northern Treatment of Civil War 
Confederate Prisoners (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2008), contends that ultimately the break 
down of exchange rests on the shoulders of the Confederacy due to their refusal to recognise African 
American Union soldiers as POWs, p. 4; Charles W. Sanders, Jr., While in the Hands of the Enemy: Military 
Prisons of the Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,  2005), suggests that the 
governments on both sides demonstrated a remarkable lack of humanitarian concern for POWs, p. 5.
14 There were instances of parole in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), the Boer War (1899-1902) and the 
First World War,  but in general terms, after the American Civil War, the practice began its demise. For the 
Franco-Prussian War, see: Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War: the German Invasion of France, 
1870-1871 (New York: Routledge, 2004),  p.  222.  The Prussian army allowed French officers to leave on their 
parole after the Prussian victory at the Battle of Sedan.  For the Boer War, see: Major Gary D. Brown, 
‘Prisoner of War Parole: Ancient Concept, Modern Utility’, Military Law Review, vol. 156 (June 1998),  p. 
207. The Boer guerrillas tried to place British POWs on parole, but these were largely disregarded. For the 
First World War, see: Paul Robinson, Military Honour and the Conduct of War: From Ancient Greece to Iraq 
(London and New York, 2006), p. 156. The French placed some German officers on parole early in the 
conflict, but the practice was not reciprocated by the Germans.
This is made all the more intriguing because the Union was under no obligation to 
recognise the practice. As the First  Chapter will discuss, although the Americans 
subscribed to theories of international law, the American Civil War was not a conflict 
between two belligerent states. In nineteenth-century international law, the term 
‘belligerent’ signified that the opposing army was a legitimate force and entitled to the 
privileges, such as parole, set forth in the international laws of war.15 As Waite made very 
clear, the Confederate States was an authority “I do not know”. When the eleven Southern 
states seceded in 1861 to form the Confederate States of America, the Union’s official 
policy, as set out by President Abraham Lincoln, was to refuse the Confederacy any 
recognition of state legitimacy. The Union instead labelled Confederate armies ‘rebels’.16 
In this context, the Union was under no international legal obligations to recognise the 
paroles issued by Confederate officers.
 Nevertheless, the Confederate officers issuing the paroles at San Antonio clearly  
believed the act to be valid. Despite Waite’s protestations that he did not recognise the 
Confederacy, he and his men left  Major Maclin on nothing more than their word of honour 
that they would not fight. The Southern officer’s belief that the Northern soldiers would 
abide by their word of honour proved, for the most part, well founded. From April 1861 
onwards, paroles were regularly and systematically employed between the Confederate and 
Union armies in absence of any official policy or agreements on the treatment of POWs 
between the two governments. In July 1862 an official agreement on POWs was reached 
with the Dix-Hill Cartel, but this merely legitimated and defined the parole system already 
8
15  Stephen C. Neff, Justice in Blue and Gray: A Legal History of the Civil War (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2010), p. 5. 
16 Neff, Justice in Blue and Gray, pp. 4-5; Phillip Shaw Paludan, A People’s Contest: The Union and Civil 
War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), p. 33. 
operating.17  The privilege of parole, typically reserved for the commissioned officer, was 
even extended to the soldiers he commanded, with one difference: the officers gave their 
word of honour while the soldiers gave their oath.18
 The initial use and eventual demise of the parole system in the American Civil War, 
being one of the last  instances of military  parole in western conflicts, provides a useful 
case study on the nineteenth-century  American understanding of ‘military  honour’ and the 
changing nature of warfare. As historian John A. Lynn argues, “by  adopting a cultural 
approach to the study of war and combat, we better appreciate the variety and changes that 
have typified military institutions, thought and practices over the ages.”19  As the First and 
Second Chapter will argue, the concept of ‘honour’ at  both an international ‘state’ level and 
on a personal basis allowed the parole system to operate in the early years of the American 
Civil War. Both the North and the South were interested in, and subscribed to, the 
European conception of the international laws of war and both armies, somewhat 
surprisingly as from the Union’s perspective the war was a rebellion, believed the other 
side to be honourable.
 As past scholarship on the European use of parole demonstrates, the practice was a 
product of different ideals of honour within different nations. Historians Gavin Daly, 
Michael Lewis and Norman Hampson in their works on parole in early  nineteenth-century 
Britain and France, suggest that the practice in European conflicts was defined by an 
9
17 OR, Series 2, Volume 4, pp. 266-268. 
18  H.W. Halleck, International Law, or, Rules regulating the intercourse of states in peace and war (San 
Francisco: H.H. Bancroft, 1861), p. 433. 
19 Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture, p. XIV. 
aristocratic conception of honour.20  Officers were drawn from the aristocracy  in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and were entitled to parole because their ‘word of 
honour’ was respected by other officers of similar social standing.21  Parole was as much a 
product of cultural assumptions within different nations as it was a practical system of 
looking after prisoners. It therefore stands to reason, that parole would be influenced by the 
culture in which it was employed. Historian Paul Robinson claims, for example: “Whereas 
in previous wars, parole was something only  an officer could give, in the American Civil 
War all ranks were considered to be gentlemen whose word of honour was sufficient 
guarantee for release.”22 As Robinson does not expand on this point any further, this thesis 
will subsequently examine the significance of the ‘oath of honour’ given by patriotic 
citizen-soldiers in the American Civil War. 
 The democratic nature of American society and the high esteem paid to the dedicated 
and virtuous ‘citizen-soldiers’ meant that the military honour reserved for the 
commissioned officer was extended to the soldiers he commanded. Historian Gerald 
Linderman pioneered the idea that the values of nineteenth-century American society were 
carried into the war by  the “young men of the 1860s”.23 As America, a democracy, had no 
hereditary  aristocracy and ‘honour’ was a value esteemed in both marital and civilian 
10
20  Daly, ‘Napoleon’s Lost Legions’, p. 366; Michael Lewis, Napoleon and his British Captives (London: 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1962), p. 44; Norman Hampson, ‘The French Revolution and the Nationalization 
of Honour’, in M.R.D. Foot (ed.), War and Society: Historical essays in honour and memory of J.R. Western 
1928-1971 (London: Paul Elek, 1973), p. 203. 
21 Hampson, ‘The French Revolution and the Nationalization of Honour’, p. 203. 
22 Robinson, Military Honour and the Conduct of War, p. 129. 
23  Gerald F. Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War (New 
York: The Free Press, 1987), p. 2; Somewhat limited by his use of only a few select diaries and memoirs, 
Linderman contends that ‘courage’ was the main virtue held by Civil War soldiers. Lorien Foote, The 
Gentlemen and the Roughs: Manhood, Honor, and Violence in the Union Army (New York and London: New 
York University Press,  2010), makes the valid claim “[i]t is important to link courage with related traits of 
manhood, something that Linderman does not do adequately...Courage was intimately connected with 
honor”, p. 57.  
contexts, the privilege of parole could hardly be given to the officer but denied to the 
soldier. By extending the practice of parole to accommodate thousands of men, previously 
held assumptions and beliefs towards this ‘honourable’ practice started to change. 
Traditionally, the collapse of the parole system in 1863 is credited to poor administrative 
foresight and the irreconcilable discord in relations between the North and South, caused 
by Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation of January 1863.24  While the political debates 
and acts between the Union and Confederacy should not be undervalued, this thesis 
proposes that prior to the Emancipation Proclamation, parole was no longer viewed as a 
viable POW policy for soldiers. As Chapter Three will argue, changing perceptions 
regarding the ‘honourable’ practice of parole can be linked to the uniquely American way 
the practice was used and the harsh reality of the American Civil War. 
 Ultimately then, this thesis is concerned with understanding the practice of parole in 
the American Civil War by  looking at America’s engagement and dedication to European 
international law and the prevalence and importance of ‘honour’ in Union and Confederate 
armies. International law served as the framework for POW policies while the cultural 
assumptions within America regarding honour both allowed the practice to operate while 
fundamentally changing its character. The nature of the Civil War forced officials and 
soldiers to question a pre-war culture of honour. 
 To understand nineteenth-century  international law and the military culture in 
America, works by prominent Victorian international legal theorists and the American 
Articles of War will be examined. These sources present an idealised picture of both state 
11
24 Glenn Robins, ‘Race,  Reparations,  and Galvanized Rebels: Union Prisoners and the Exchange Question in 
Deep South Prison Camps’, Civil War History,  vol. 53, no. 2 (June 2007), p. 118; Hesseltine,  Civil War 
Prisons,  p. 34; Sanders, While in the Hands of the Enemy, see: Chapter One: ‘A People Unprepared’, pp. 
7-25; Gillispie, Andersonvilles of the North, p. 4. 
behaviour and military discipline. As John A. Lynn claims, “[f]or a number of reasons, the 
discourse on war tries to modify  reality to more nearly resemble conceptions of how war 
should be. Thus societies impose conventions and laws on the conduct of war.”25  Even if 
theories did not always match reality, international legal textbooks and the Articles of War 
made a strong argument for ‘honour and humanity’ in warfare and the importance of the 
‘word of a gentleman’—arguments and language used both by  military men and in official 
policy to shape and justify the character of the war. The letters, reports and proclamations 
contained in the 126 volume series, The Official Record of the War of the Rebellion will 
also be examined. Though there are thousands of documents detailing debates and policies 
relating to the issue of POWs, this thesis is concerned mainly with instances of parole 
which demonstrate how the practice was used and carried out, in addition to official POW 
policies that had a significant affect on the practice. As the debates over parole and honour 
were not  confined solely to official letters, newspaper reports on the use of parole will also 
be considered. Newspapers in America during the 1860s were numerous and partisan, 
generally  supporting the Republican aspirations for the preservation of the union and 
abolition, or the Southern Democrat support for secession.26 As these newspapers wrote for 
the expectation of their readers, newspaper articles provide a useful insight into changing 
public perceptions on the practice of parole.
 The changing perceptions regarding parole are important as they  point to a broader 
change in warfare. The transitional nature of the American Civil War and its status as a 
forerunner to the ‘total wars’ of the twentieth century  has long been debated in the 
12
25 Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture, p. XXI. 
26  Brayton Harris, Blue and Gray in Black and White: Newspapers in the Civil War (Washington and 
London: Batsford Brassey, 1999), p. 9; Alan A. Siegel, For the Glory of the Union: Myth, Reality,  and the 
Media in Civil War New Jersey (London and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1984), pp. 7-8; Andrew S. 
Coppersmith, Fighting Words: An Illustrated History of Newspaper Accounts of the Civil War (New York and 
London: The New Press, 2004), p. 7. 
literature.27  The use of parole in the American Civil War demonstrated “a gentlemanly 
conduct, even towards the enemy” akin to the limited wars of the eighteenth century.28 This 
gentlemanly conduct was challenged, however, by the magnitude of the Civil War. With 
thousands of men fighting, dying, and being captured in confusing, long and bloody 
battles, it  became increasingly difficult to uphold the ideal of individualised and personal 
honour in combat as exemplified by parole. Esteem for honour and a gentleman’s word did 
not completely  fade in this period, but the decline of parole shows how an ideal of personal 
honour in warfare—recognised and enforced by individuals who gave their word and 
expected it to be trusted—was rendered less effective by the brutal reality  of the American 
Civil War. 
13
27 For works that challenge the idea that the American Civil War was a ‘total war’, see: Mark Grimsley, The 
Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press,  1995); Mark E. Neely, Jr., ‘“Civilized Belligerents”: Abraham Lincoln and the idea of 
“Total War”’, in John Y. Simon and Michael E. Stevens (eds.), New Perspectives on the Civil War: Myths and 
Realities of the National Conflict (Madison: Madison House, 1998), pp. 3-25; Mark E. Neely, ‘Was the Civil 
War a Total War?’, Civil War History,  vol. 50,  no. 4 (December 2004), pp. 434-458; For works that suggest 
the American Civil War was a ‘total war’, see: James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War 
Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) p. 333; Linderman, Embattled Courage, p. 3. 
28 Francis Lieber, The Character of the Gentleman (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1864), p. 98. 
- Chapter I -
HONOUR AND HUMANITY IN WAR
International Law in America and the Practice of Parole
“[B]y a custom which equally displays the honour and humanity of the Europeans, an 
officer, taken prisoner in war is released on his parole, and enjoys the comfort of passing 
the time of his captivity in his own country.”29
 Military parole was a product of international law, intended to be applied between 
two belligerent states during war. It was part of the larger attempt to apply  legal principles 
and rules of restraint to the chaos of war during the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century.30  From an international legal perspective, the use of parole in the American Civil 
War is both understandable and intriguing. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the relative youth 
of the American nation and its ‘experimental’ Republican government, there was 
considerable interest in international law throughout the nineteenth century. The practice of 
parole highlighted a nation’s adherence to the principles of honour and humanity in 
warfare. It proclaimed the ‘civilisation’ of ‘great nations’. There were clear cultural 
dimensions to the practice, as ‘honour’ was a cultural construct, but it is first necessary to 
examine how both the Confederacy  and the Union viewed parole. Throughout the 
American Civil War, international law was as clarifying as it was confusing. In many ways, 
the fact that parole was even employed by  the Union was contrary to international law. As 
the Union never recognised the Confederacy as a sovereign belligerent state, they were 
under no obligation to abide by the laws of war in their conduct towards the Confederate 
14
29  Emmerich de Vattel and Joseph Chitty, trans., The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature 
(Philadelphia: T.J.W. Johson, 1852), p. 354. 
30 John A. Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2004), p. 134. 
armies.31 The fact that parole was eventually adopted into official Union policies highlights 
the important role that theories of international law and ‘civilised’ warfare played in the 
American Civil War. 
 Despite calls to place the Civil War in its international context, scholars looking at 
POW practices during the conflict have, for the most part, ignored the international 
dimensions or implications of the move.32  Historian Charles W. Sanders Jr., for example, 
implies that despite America’s extensive involvement in armed conflicts—including the 
American Revolution, the Anglo-American War of 1812 and the Mexican War of 
1846-1848—the American leaders and people had learnt little from their experiences in 
regards to POW practices.33  Drawing on official records, Sanders points to the thousands 
of Union and Confederate men who died in war prisons as testament to the indifference 
and ignorance of Civil War leaders.34  Though it is difficult to dispute the fact  that both the 
Confederacy and the Union were thoroughly unprepared for the number of POWs the Civil 
War created, to say that  the Americans were not working from any framework or were 
ignorant of how to treat POWs is problematic. As United States Attorney General James 
Speed, adviser to the President on constitutional law, reflected in July  1865: “Congress can 
declare war. When was is declared, it must be, under the Constitution, carried on according 
to the known laws and usages of war amongst civilized nations....The Constitution does not 
15
31  Stephen C. Neff, Justice in Blue and Gray: A Legal History of the Civil War (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2010), pp. 4-5. 
32 For works that place the American Civil War in an international context, see: Ian Tyrrell, Transnational 
Nation: United States History in Global Perspective Since 1789 (Houndmills, Basingstoke & Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Philip Shaw Paludan, A People’s Contest: The Union & Civil War 1861-1865 
(Kansas: University Press of Kansas,  1996); Hugh Dubrulle,  ‘A Military Legacy of the Civil War: The British 
Inheritance’, Civil War History, vol. 49, no. 2 (June 2003), pp.  153-180; C.A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern 
World 1780-1914 (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), pp. 165-1168.
33 Charles W. Sanders,  Jr., While in the Hands of the Enemy: Military Prisons of the Civil War (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2005), p. 24; Also see Chapter One: ‘A People Unprepared’, pp. 7-25. 
34 Sanders,  While in the Hands of the Enemy, p. 1. 
permit this Government to prosecute a war as an uncivilized and barbarous people.”35 
International law, or the law of nations, was linked, according to Speed, to the American 
Constitution because “[t]he framers of the Constitution knew that a nation could not 
maintain an honorable place amongst the nations of the world that does not regard the great 
and essential principles of the law of nations as a part of the law of the land.”36  Though 
Speed’s opinion was given after the fighting, the debates between the Confederacy and the 
Union surrounding questions of international law suggests that both sides were familiar 
with the sentiment expressed by Speed. The practice of parole, though applied, at first, in 
disregard to the debates occurring between Lincoln and Confederate President Davis, was 
derived from the international laws of war and regularly  and systematically  employed by 
officers in the field. Americans did have a framework for POW practices; they  grounded 
their actions in an understanding of the laws of war. 
 In the late eighteenth and early  nineteenth century, it was the ‘great nations’ of 
Europe that promoted the tenants of international law.  Under the intellectual environment 
of the Enlightenment, a great deal of military literature was published emphasizing the 
need, and the possibility, of turning military  strategy into a universal science.37  In 
comparison to the wars of the nineteenth century, eighteenth century  conflicts were more 
limited, precise and ‘gentlemanly’.38   This type of warfare was complemented by theories 
on the international laws of war.39 Warfare in the nineteenth century  was distinct  from the 
16
35  James Speed, ‘Opinion Military Commissions’,  in J. Hubley Ashton (ed.), Official Opinions of the 
Attorneys General of the United States, Advising the President and Heads of Departments in Relation to their 
Official Duties Volume XI (Washington D.C.: W.H. & O.H. Morrison, 1869), p. 300. 
36 Speed, ‘Military Commissions’, p. 299. 
37  Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), p. 27.
38 Gat, A History of Military Thought, p. 95; Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture,  see ‘Chapter 4: 
Linear Warfare: Images and Ideals of Combat in the Age of Enlightenment’, pp. 111-145.
39 Emmerich de Vattel first published his highly influential work The Law of Nations, in 1758. 
conflicts of the eighteenth century, but the relevance and interest in international law 
remained strong.40  The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars had engulfed a great 
many nations of Europe and the tangled web of imperial claims and international trade 
called for regulation.41  Public opinion on warfare, shaped and disseminated by the growth 
of newspapers, also called for more humane treatment for soldiers.42  International law was 
a way to ‘civilize’ warfare and deflect criticism of war-making. Humane POW practices 
were especially important in this context as they demonstrated that the intent of war was 
not to harm the innocent nor inflict gratuitous violence on the enemy. American legal 
theorist Archer Polson, for example, argued in 1853, that “[t]he modern law of nations 
prohibits those barbarous customs which distinguished the warfare of early times. 
Considering war simply  as a means to protect nations in the enjoyment of their just rights 
and lawful possession it condemns all cruelty not absolutely necessary  to secure that 
end.”43  In international law, parole was promoted as a humane and just way of dealing with 
a surrendered enemy. 
 Military parole, a product of international POW practices, has a long history. Its use, 
as with all POW practices, varied according to the time period, culture, the nature of 
17
40 See: Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), p. 168. 
41 Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, pp. 128-132.  
42  H.J. Hanham, ‘Religion and Nationality in the Mid-Victorian Army’, in M.R.D. Foot (ed.),  War and 
Society: Historical Essays in Honour and Memory of J.R. Western 1928-1971 (London: Paul Elek, 1973), p. 
167; Olive Anderson, ‘The Treatment of Prisoners of War in Britain During the American War of 
Independence’, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, vol. 28,  no. 1 (1955), p. 70; Brayton Harris, 
Blue and Gray in Black and White: Newspapers in the Civil War (Washington and London: Batsford Brassey, 
1999), p. 2; David Francis Taylor, ‘“The Fate of Empires”: The American War, Political Parody, and 
Sheridan’s Comedies’, Eighteenth-Century Studies, vol. 42, no. 3 (Spring 2009), p. 380. 
43 Archer Polson, Principles of the Law of Nations: with practical notes and supplementary essays on the law 
of blockade and on contraband of war: to which is added, Diplomacy by Thomas Hartwell Horne 
(Philadelphia: T. & J.W. Johnson, 1853), p. 42.
warfare and different armies.44  By the late sixteenth century, the practice was primarily 
reserved for the officers in European armies.45  Signing a parole in the context of a war 
meant that an officer gave his parole d’honneur or ‘word of honour’, that he would not 
fight or take any actions against the opposing army or government.46 Common or enlisted 
soldiers, made POWs, were generally confined at the expense of the captor’s government 
until they could be exchanged.47  Men on parole were free to move across enemy  borders to 
return home or were given partial freedom within a designated area.48  Records were kept 
of the officers who signed a parole, and if they were captured again by the enemy they 
could be executed.49  Despite the deterrent of death-upon-capture for parole breakers, for 
the parole system to work, certain criteria had to be met. Firstly, both armies had to 
recognise their enemy as a legitimate opponent. As the parole system worked on the 
premise that officers would abide by the international laws of war, it had to be assumed 
that they were operating as a legitimate and recognisable army. Secondly, both sides had to 
18
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subscribe to similar notions of ‘honour’. It was an ‘officer’s word of honour’, after all, that 
formed the basis of this POW system. 
 The language used to promote the practice of military  parole was ‘honour and 
humanity’. Influential Swiss jurist  Emmerich de Vattel described the practice as displaying 
“the honour and humanity of the Europeans” as it allowed “an officer, taken prisoner in 
war...the comfort of passing the time of his captivity  in his own country, in the midst of his 
family; and the party  who have thus released him as perfectly sure of him as if they  had 
him confined in irons.”50  Officers on parole therefore remained, in the formal sense, 
prisoners of war and could return to duty if they were exchanged.51  Describing the parole 
system in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, American legal theorist Henry 
Wheaton noted, sometimes “prisoners of war are permitted, by capitulation, to return to 
their own country, upon condition not to serve again during the war, or until duly 
exchanged”.52  The term ‘capitulation’ meant “surrendering to an enemy upon stipulated 
terms.”53  Officers, “are frequently  released upon their parole, subject to the same 
condition. Good faith and humanity  ought to preside over the execution of these compacts, 
which are designed to mitigate the evils of war, without defeating its legitimate purpose.”54 
Parole was therefore promoted as a practice carried out by honourable nations to uphold 
humanity in warfare. 
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 It should be noted as well, that there were great practical and ‘mutual benefits’ to the 
practice of parole. In earlier European conflicts, mainly before the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, POWs could be turned into slaves, held for ransom, forced or 
enticed into switching sides, or quite simply, be killed upon capture.55  By the seventeenth 
century, such practices denoted ‘barbarity’, and due to fear of retaliation in kind, could no 
longer be freely  employed.56  Historian Barbara Donegan suggests in her work on parole in 
the English Civil War (1642-1651) that as the opposing armies shared conceptions about 
honour, a parole system could operate because it worked to the mutual advantage of both 
armies. As caring for POWs required money and resources, and civilised armies could no 
longer slaughter or turn their prisoners into slaves, parole was both a humane way of 
treating POWs while simultaneously removing the financial burden of caring for them; 
once paroled, soldiers had to provide for themselves.57 Donegan admits, however, that  the 
parole system was successful because both sides were English. When the Irish entered the 
conflict, the English failed to afford them the same courtesy, viewing them as “outside the 
protections of honour and humanity.”58  Parole was both functional and a way of giving 
belligerents the ability to choose who was worthy of honour and who was not. Thus, the 
only way the parole system could work was if each side regarded the other as honourable. 
 Even with international legal texts, international law in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries was notoriously difficult to enforce. Unlike domestic law, which was regulated 
by a well-defined government or state, there was no overarching authority to define or 
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enforce international law at this time.59  The concept of state sovereignty (established in 
Europe at the conclusion of the Thirty Years’ War with the Treaty of Westphalia) 
established the theoretical right  of each state to act  on an equal footing in relation to other 
states.60  The American lawyer Henry Wheaton opened his lengthy Elements of 
International Law (first published in 1836) by stating: “There is no legislative or judicial 
authority, recognized by all nations, which determines the law that regulates the reciprocal 
relations of states . . . in the great society  of nations there is no legislative power, and 
consequently there are no express laws, except those which result from the conventions 
which states make with one another.”61  International law in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century was therefore founded on the mutual acceptance of certain practices and behaviour 
between states. 
 The majority of nineteenth-century texts dealing with the law of nations begin with 
lengthy attempts to define the principles and concepts of international law. In many ways, 
international law was as much an intellectual debate as it was a solid system of world 
governance. Theorists drew on and critiqued the work of other well-known theorists, such 
as Emmerich de Vattel, Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, and Cornelius van 
Bynkershoek.62  Their debates took place in a rarefied sphere. Typically producing weighty 
tomes that ran to a thousand or so pages, and frequently  using Latin in their definitions, 
they  wrote for the specialist or student, rather than for interested lay  people or government 
officials. They were intellectuals and did not set out to produce definitive guides for state 
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practices. Indeed, a definitive guide on international law would have been impossible to 
write, given that international law was the product of state interaction and therefore subject 
to change. International legal texts consequently drew their examples from past conflicts.63 
This meant that theories could sometimes be one-step  behind reality. Nonetheless, their 
texts provide insight into how international law worked in the nineteenth century because 
they  detailed common assumptions about how states did or should behave. They present an 
idealised form of international law based on history and observations of state behaviour. 
American officials were familiar with the language and ideas present in these texts and 
drew on theorists to justify  their actions. Consequently, while these texts did not create 
international law they  put forth influential intellectual debates and analyses which they 
derived from state behaviour.  
 What did serve as the guidelines for international law were common state practices 
based on similar cultural or political assumptions. As Henry Wheaton stated: “in the great 
society of nations there...are no express laws, except those which result from conventions 
which States may make with one another”64  To establish these practices, states ratified 
treaties with each other outlining expected conduct in trade and commerce, naval 
regulations, territorial boundaries, consuls and diplomacy and conduct in warfare. 
Congresses and conventions were also used, although these tended to be somewhat 
decadent affairs at  the dawn of the nineteenth century and generally  dominated by the great 
powers.65 
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 If the number of textbooks and treaties are anything to go by, Americans in the 
Victorian era were extremely interested in the law of nations. The famous eighteenth-
century Swiss jurist Emmerich de Vattel’s work was published in English in various 
editions throughout the nineteenth century  in America and Wheaton’s Elements of 
International Law stayed in publication from 1836 to 1936.66  United States’ treaties with 
Prussia and Spain after America declared independence further illustrate that Americans 
subscribed to the ideas of European international legal theorists. Though war between 
Prussia and America never broke out in this period, the Treaty  of Amity and Commerce 
Between His Majesty the King of Prussia, and the United States of America (ratified in 
1786), established how each country should behave towards the other in warfare. The 
treaty consisted of 27 articles covering a variety of state concerns (including naval 
considerations, how citizens or subjects of each country should be treated while in the 
other, trade and the conduct that should be adopted by the two nations while engaged in 
war either with their own enemy, a common enemy or each other) but article 24 
encompassed an extended discussion about how POWs were to be treated.67 Indeed, article 
24 comprised the largest paragraph in the whole document and stated that if war did break 
out between the two nations, the treaty would remain in force: 
[I]t is declared, that neither the pretence that war dissolves all treaties, nor 
any other whatever, shall be considered as annulling or suspending this & 
the next preceding article . . . the state of war is precisely that for which they 
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are provided, & during which they  are to be as sacredly  observed as the 
most acknowledged articles in the law of nature or nations.68 
The POW practices that were to be “sacredly observed” between the two states included 
confining prisoners in “their dominions in Europe or America, in wholesome situations” 
and allowing officers to be “enlarged on their paroles within convenient  districts, & 
have comfortable quarters”.69
 This concern with defining POW practices with other European nations was likely 
the product of America’s experience with Britain during the American Revolution. Careful 
not to formally recognise American independence through POW practices, Britain never 
entered into any official agreements with the Americans on parole or exchange.70  However, 
these practices were still frequently carried out during the war but under no mutually 
agreed upon framework.71  In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, formal POW 
frameworks consisted of ‘cartels’.72 It was understood that only belligerent sovereign states 
could enter into ‘cartels’. When France entered the war in 1778 on the side of the 
Americans, for example, Britain sought to set up  official POW policies through a general-
exchange cartel. According to historian Olive Anderson, “[w]ith France, and only  with 
France, the [British] government was willing and even anxious to make a general 
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exchange”.73  In addition to this snub to American sovereignty, rumours and reports of 
mistreatment and hardships suffered by American prisoners at British hands circulated 
throughout the conflict and left a bitter aftertaste many  years on.74 It therefore made sense 
for the newly independent American nation to advertise its sovereignty  and establish its 
place among the ranks of ‘honourable nations’ through formal and humane POW 
agreements with other states. In the Anglo-American War of 1812, the work of Emmerich 
de Vattel served as the guide for the conduct, particularly  for the Americans.75  Parole and 
formal POW policy  was also employed by  the Americans during the Mexican War 
(1846-1848).76  Again, as United States Attorney  General James Speed claimed, “war is 
required by the framework of our Government to be prosecuted according to the known 
usages of war amongst the civilized nations of the earth”.77  From the early days of the 
American nation, there was a conscious effort  to abide by  international law in America’s 
foreign relations. 
 Despite the plethora of works dedicated to international law in the nineteenth 
century, actual definitions on how states should act  were somewhat vague. From the outset, 
the American Civil War generated numerous difficult  legal issues over how to deal with an 
internal, rather than an international, conflict. Facing an enemy that  had declared itself a 
new state, the Federal government was forced to confront these issues from day one of the 
conflict. The newly formed Confederacy constituted a considerable stretch of American 
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soil, encompassing the states of South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Texas, Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee and North Carolina.78  As soon as these 
states seceded, they set up their own government, headed by President Jefferson Davis in 
Richmond, Virginia. Drawing up a new Constitution, they  asserted that they were now 
operating as a sovereign state.79  As the popular New Orleans magazine Debow’s Review 
stated in the early  stages of the conflict: “No civil strife is this; no struggle of Guelph and 
Ghibelline; no contest between York and Lancaster; but a war of alien races, distinct 
nationalities, and opposite, hostile and eternally  antagonistic Governments.”80  This 
somewhat hyperbolic account (not unusual in the South at this time) sums up the 
Confederate’s position nicely: they believed that they  were a sovereign state and that this 
was a war between two distinct nations.
 Broadly  under international law, a war between two sovereign states required that the 
two opposing forces treat each other as equals and in accordance with the laws of war. As 
Wheaton defined it: “A contest by force between independent sovereign States is called a 
public war. If it is declared in form, or duly commenced, it entitles both the belligerent 
parties to all the rights of war against each other.”81 This is hardly  surprising given that the 
basis of international law was the concept of state sovereignty. As outlined by  numerous 
theorists in the nineteenth century, the laws of war required each side to treat the other in a 
civilised and humane manner. Wheaton defined this civilised conduct as: “No use of force 
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is lawful, except so far as it is necessary. . . the inhabitants of the enemy’s country who are 
not in arms, or who, being in arms, submit and surrender themselves, may not  be slain. . . . 
Those ends may be accomplished by making prisoners of those who are taken in arms, or 
compelling them to give security that they will not bear arms against the victor.”82  It 
therefore made perfect sense for the Confederacy to put Union officers on parole. Just as 
America would have treated captured Prussian soldiers in an honourable and humane 
manner, the Confederacy wished to establish that they too were a humane and honourable 
sovereign nation.
 The desire to act in accordance with the honourable and humane practices of war was 
perhaps further enhanced by the knowledge that Europe was watching the conflict  intently. 
The Confederacy  would have benefitted greatly from military support  or formal 
recognition of independence by  European states.83  Civil War era newspapers in both the 
North and the South frequently reported the views of Britain, in particular, on the 
conflict.84  The British press likewise took great interest in the incredibly  bloody conflict 
occurring just across the Atlantic.85  By mid-nineteenth century, the role of newspapers in 
shaping public perceptions on war was exerting greater influence in countries like Britain 
and America due to increasing literacy and the expansion of the press and printing 
technology.86  During the Civil War there were 2,500 newspapers in print in America 
alone.87  Given the desire to be viewed as a ‘civilised’ nation by both the Union and the 
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world, acting as an honourable sovereign state by  treating Northern troops in a humane 
manner throughout the American Civil War was in the Confederacy’s best  interest. 
President Davis, for example, informed President Lincoln on July  6, 1861,  “[i]t is the 
desire of this Government so to conduct the war now existing as to mitigate its horrors as 
far as may be possible....Some [prisoners] have been permitted to return home on parole; 
others to remain at large under similar condition within this Confederacy”.88  The popular 
Southern publication the Southern Literary Messenger, similarly argued in October 1861 
that the Confederate States “have acted towards the Northern States with the most 
imprudent generosity, even forbearing to require of prisoners...the customary parole.”89 
Establishing a reputation for honourable and civilised practice in war was vital for the 
Confederate States. 
 For the Union, the issue was not so straightforward. Recognising the Confederacy as 
a legitimate sovereign nation would mean that the Union had little reason to meet the 
Confederacy in hostility. For example, if the North recognised the South as sovereign and 
still engaged in conflict, then the North could be perceived as an invading army seeking 
territorial conquest.90 The Federal government never recognised the Confederate States as 
a sovereign nation, instead labelling them rebels.91 The way in which the Union was meant 
to treat  these ‘rebels’ was not clear. Wheaton argued that it did not matter if the war was of 
a civil nature, the same laws of war should apply: “A civil war between the different 
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members of the same society is what Grotius calls a mixed war....the general usage of 
nations regards such a war as entitling both the contending parties to all the rights of war 
against each other”.92  Henry Wager Halleck, who was by this time a senior commander in 
the U.S. army, however, summed up the position or sentiment of the Union more aptly:
Wars of insurrection and revolution are, in one sense, civil wars; but this 
term is more usually  applied to those factions, for part ascendency  in a state, 
rather than for its dismemberment, or for a radical change in its 
government. . . . Mere rebellions, however, are considered as exceptions to 
this rule, as every  government treats those who rebel against its authority 
according to its own municipal laws, and without regard to the general rules 
of war which international jurisprudence establishes between sovereign 
states...every neutral state, in such a contest, must determine for itself when 
it will consider a party in a rebellion, insurrection, revolution, or civil war, 
entitled to the rights of a belligerent in its international relations. Yet, it does 
this under international responsibility  to the state, previously recognized as 
sovereign.93 
In other words, the state can deal with those involved in a rebellion as it  sees fit. Under this 
definition, the Union was under no obligation to place Confederate soldiers on parole. 
Nations watching the conflict, and in the case of the Civil War this was mainly  Britain and 
France, had to determine in what light they were going to view the conflict.94  It  therefore 
was in the Union’s interest to insist that this was a rebellion, not a formal war. 
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 Nevertheless, as humane POW practices demonstrated that a nation was ‘civilised’ 
and ‘honourable’, the Union still faced a conundrum on how best to treat  the Southerners. 
Halleck wrote in his treatise International Law that a government who forced their soldiers 
to undermine their parole by taking up arms again was evidence of “ignorance and semi-
barbarism”.95  He used the example of America’s recent war with Mexico to demonstrate 
his point. The Mexican authorities, he asserted, forced paroled men to break their word by 
taking up arms again. According to Halleck, “[s]uch attempts to violate the ordinary rules 
of war not only justify, but require prompt and severe punishment. Accordingly, General 
Scott announced his intention to hang every  one who should be retaken after violating his 
parole of honor.”96  The Lincoln administration did not have to recognise the paroles given 
by the ‘rebel’ army; but significantly, in America’s last major conflict prior to the Civil 
War, the idea that a government would force troops to undermine parole was declared 
‘semi-barbaric’. 
 The Union’s initial position that the Confederate States were simply  in rebellion also 
proved difficult to maintain, as scholars have noted. According to historian Phillip Paludan, 
Britain recognised the Confederate States of America as a belligerent power on May 13, 
1861 by  declaring itself neutral in the war.97  France followed suit and declared their 
neutrality on June 10, 1861.98  Neutrality  signified a war between two belligerents, because 
if it  was a domestic rebellion, as the Union initially insisted it was, other nation’s had no 
right to intervene in the state’s affairs.99  As Halleck stated, under international law “every 
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neutral state must determine for itself when it will consider a party...entitled to the rights of 
a belligerent in its international relations.”100  The Union had not helped the matter as early 
in the war the Lincoln administration had blockaded Southern ports, an act  that signified 
war between two belligerents.101 Britain, acting with this precedent in mind, recognised the 
Confederacy as having belligerent rights. Desirous not to embroil itself in the conflict, 
however, Britain (and France) shied away from recognising Confederate State 
sovereignty.102  The status of the Confederacy was consequently  not definite but the 
‘neutral’ nation of Britain had made its position clear.  
 In 1862 and 1863 the Union also conferred belligerent rights of the Confederacy 
without actually recognising the Confederate States as sovereign. This was achieved 
through the 1862 General Exchange Cartel for Prisoners of War and the 1863 Prize Cases. 
The Prize Cases, in effect, saw the Federal Supreme Court determine the nature of the 
conflict the Union was currently engaged in.103  The Supreme Court drew on the definitions 
of Emmerich de Vattel, who defined ‘civil wars’ as conflicts that break “the bands of 
society and government, or at least suspends their force and effect; it produces in the nation 
two independent parties, who consider each other as enemies, and acknowledge no 
common judge”.104  Consequently, as these two parties have no common judge “they stand 
in precisely the same predicament as two nations who engage in a contest and have 
recourse to arms....This being the case, it is very  evident that the common laws of war-
those maxims of humanity, moderation, and honor- ought to be observed by  both 
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parties”.105  The official stance the Union took was therefore “[i]t is not necessary that the 
independence of the revolted province or State be acknowledged in order to constitute it a 
belligerent in war according to the law of nations. Foreign nations acknowledge it  as a war 
by declaration of neutrality.”106  The Union then, could also issue paroles and observe the 
traditional POW practices without recongising Confederate sovereignty but still abiding by 
“those maxims of humanity, moderation, and honor”.
 As the next chapter will demonstrate, the practice of parole was informally  carried 
out between the Northern and Southern armies at the outbreak of hostilities. These 
informal practices were codified in 1862 General Exchange Cartel—an act in accordance 
with international law and recognising Confederate belligerent rights. United States 
Attorney  General Edward Bates advised President Lincoln that the Cartel “is our mutual 
contract, “of binding obligation” upon both parties, and neither party can avoid it, because 
it is inconvenient in its practical operation. It can be altered only by mutual consent.”107 
Bates was therefore suggesting that the Cartel was an act under international law. The 
Union may not have recognised the Confederacy as a sovereign belligerent state, but 
regarding POWs, the Union conceded that the Confederacy could act in a belligerent 
capacity. Thus, the mutually agreed upon Cartel could only  be altered by mutual consent. 
The General Exchange Cartel, drawn up by  Union Major-General John A. Dix and 
Confederate Major- General D.H. Hill, consisted on nine articles outlining the ranking 
systems of exchange, the logistics of exchange and the nature of prisoner confinement and 
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parole.108  Article 6 stated that  “all prisoners, of whatever arm of service, are to be 
exchanged or paroled in ten days from the time of their capture” and that during the 
process of exchange the officer or soldier on parole is not to be “considered as exchanged 
and absolved from his parole until his equivalent  has actually reached the lines of his 
friends.”109The Cartel provided a framework for both the Union and Confederacy 
regarding the practice of parole.
 The American Civil War was a conflict in which both the United States and the 
Confederate States of America sought to justify and define their behaviour under 
international law. The international laws of war provided a framework for parole, and the 
practice’s association with honour and humanity in warfare meant that the Confederacy, 
and eventually the Union, recognised the paroles signed in the early years of the conflict. 
For the Confederacy, the practice of parole signaled to other nations and the Union that 
they  intended to fight the war as a sovereign state operating within the framework of the 
laws of war. The initial place of paroles in the Union, however, was slightly more 
ambiguous. The Lincoln administration did not wish to recognise the Confederate States as 
sovereign. If sovereignty was recognised, the North would have very little reason to fight 
the South. POW practices, generally applied to two sovereign belligerent nations, may 
indicate to the rest of the world that the Union viewed the Confederacy as a sovereign 
state. Still, the North, similar to the South, was conscious of the arguments for honour and 
humanity in war. As the next chapter will demonstrate, there was also a cultural dimension 
to parole which allowed both Northern and Southern armies to employ the practice prior to 
any official POW policies between the opposing governments. The Union, eventually 
33
108 OR, Series 2, Volume 4, pp. 266-268.  
109 OR, Series 2, Volume 4,, p. 267. 
defining the Confederacy  as belligerent but  not sovereign, was able to formally recognise 
these paroles in official POW policy.
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- Chapter II -
THE WORD OF AN OFFICER AND THE OATH OF A SOLDIER
Honour and Parole in the Early Years of the American Civil War
! International law provided the framework and incentive for military  practices such as 
parole, but the cultural assumptions and beliefs within or between nations allowed the 
practice to operate. Military parole was as much a cultural construct as it was a humane 
and logical system to deal with war captives. At its base, military  parole operated on the 
assumption that a gentleman would abide by  his word of honour. Similar to the laws of 
war, where honourable and humane conduct in warfare denoted ‘civilization’, the ability  to 
keep  one’s word illustrated a gentleman’s adherence to the laws of honour. In the early 
years of the American Civil War (1861-1863), both Northern and Southern prisoners of 
war could give their word of honour or their oaths that they would not take up  arms against 
the opposing government unless exchanged. International law sanctioned this practice but 
given the international legal difficulties between the Union and the Confederacy at the start 
of the war, no POW policies were formally agreed upon until 1862. The parole system 
began, however, early  in 1861. A similar understanding of military honour was 
consequently present in the two armies. 
! As parole was based on cultural assumptions on honour, it is logical that the practice 
could be shaped to suit the nations or nation employing it. Military parole in the American 
Civil War drew inspiration from European precedents. Parole, with its emphasis on a 
gentleman’s word of honour, was typically reserved on the Continent for eighteenth-
century aristocratic officers. Common soldiers, under the command of their ‘noble’ 
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officers, were not entitled to this privilege.110  In the American Civil War, by contrast, all 
white soldiers had access to parole, making the system unique.111  This was the result of a 
different conception of ‘honour’ within America. As this Chapter will demonstrate, 
however, the ideal military  gentleman was still represented by the commissioned officer. 
The differentiation between a soldier’s ‘word of honour’ and ‘oath’ in paroles suggests that 
officers understood and abided by a code of military  honour which entitled them to give 
their word. This ‘code of honour’ was a product of their military  education and training. As 
the majority of Civil War soldiers were volunteers without any previous military 
experience, it was unlikely that they had a solid understanding of the practice of parole.112 
The commissioned officer and his parole of honour provided an example of the practice for 
the men he commanded. The honour that was reserved for the officer, was, in practical 
terms extended to the soldier, but it  is first necessary  to understand what was meant  by a 
nineteenth-century ‘officer and gentleman’. 
 
 The practice of parole, with its basis in ‘honour’, was a product of cultural 
assumptions within different nations. Honour was both an inclusive and exclusive cultural 
construct. In eighteenth- and nineteenth-century  international law, “civilised” was defined 
against “savage” just as a “gentleman” was distinguished from a “common man”.113 Before 
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the Napoleonic Wars and the French Revolution drastically changed warfare on the 
Continent, European armies drew their officers from the aristocracy.114   Loyalty to the 
sovereign was expected from these men in addition to a strict adherence to their own sense 
of personal honour.115  The aristocracy could be expected to keep their parole because, as 
gentlemen, their word was respected.116  If they failed to keep their word of honour, they 
would be shamed within their community and their own governments would cashier 
(disgrace) them.117 Parole tied in well with the limited and ‘gentlemanly’ war-making that 
was idealised during the Enlightenment.118  As historian Gavin Daly  notes in his work on 
British and French prisoner treatment during the Napoleonic Wars, “[r]ather than an 
agreement between nation-states, parole reflected the shared cultural values of an 
international order of gentlemen.”119  Consequently, it is clear that parole was strongly 
linked both to the intellectual theories of international law and the cultural assumptions of 
European societies.
 
 From the outset, then, it was inevitable that the use of parole in the American Civil 
War would be slightly  different from its eighteenth-century European counterpart. America 
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was proudly democratic. This meant, in theory, a rejection of a hereditary aristocracy and 
equality  for all white males.120  Although America signed a treaty with Prussia outlining 
officer paroles in 1786, Prussia was a European nation with a monarchy and a strict  class 
structure. The use of parole with its well-known ties to aristocratic honour consequently 
seems out of place in the American Civil War—a conflict  solely  fought by Americans. 
There was some precedent, however, in America’s previous wars with Britain. The British 
used informal paroles for captured American officers during the Revolution, and there was 
a formal parole system in the War of 1812.121  In some cases, the British also paroled 
common soldiers, though this was the exception whereas in the American Civil War it was 
the norm.122 
 
 In looking at the practice of parole in the early stages of the Civil War, the concept of 
‘honour’ needs to be considered. Both antebellum Northern and Southern societies 
esteemed and understood honour. Nevertheless, defining honour and its relationship to the 
‘word of a gentleman’ is difficult because within these societies honour manifested itself in 
slightly different ways. In general terms, the South was more prone to ritualistic displays of 
honour such as duelling and lavish hospitality.123  The agricultural basis of Southern life, 
rooted in slavery  and with a sharp  division in status and wealth between the planters and 
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yeomen, was much more conducive to a close-knit community steeped in outward displays 
of honour and reputation as opposed to the industrial, impersonal and heterogenous 
Northern states.124  Northern honour was also linked to reputation but with an emphasis on 
self-restraint and education.125  It  is also somewhat difficult to characterise the honour 
cultures that permeated both the North and the South because neither society was 
homogenous. Honour could be affected by class, gender and racial relations. Women did 
not have ‘honour’ in the way  it  was ascribed to men, but they were influential in 
maintaining and defining ‘honourable’ behaviour.126 The working class had their own type 
of honour and ideas of ‘manliness’ that were distinct from the middle class and wealthy 
elite.127 The slaves in the Southern plantations did not possess any  honour according to the 
white population, and white males defined their own honour against the slaves’ lack of 
honour. Indeed, all white males in the South had ‘honour by default’ by virtue of not being 
black.128  Furthermore, the military required its own type of ‘martial honour’ that in some 
cases could be distinct from civilian practices. 
 
 The Texas Surrender, April 1861, which resulted in Confederate Major Maclin 
placing Union Colonel Waite and his men on parole, was the first  incident of paroling in 
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the American Civil War. As such, it makes a useful case study because it demonstrates that 
both Northern and Southern soldiers employed and abided by paroles prior to any  key 
battles or official POW policy. Despite the questions surrounding the international legal 
status of the Confederacy, the North and the South were operating under shared 
assumptions on honour. The surrender itself was the result of the tension that had been 
brewing in Texas ever since the presidential election of Abraham Lincoln in November 
1860.129  When South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama and Louisiana seceded from 
the Union in February 1861, the Federal government ordered General David E. Twiggs to 
protect Union interests in Texas.130 Twiggs was a seasoned (and war-wearied) soldier of the 
War of 1812, the Mexican War and the Seminole Wars and he appeared to be more 
concerned with his own retirement than the interests of the Union. Colonel Carlos A. Waite 
was to replace Twiggs and take command in February 1861.131 Around this time, a force of 
secessionist Texans forced Twiggs’s surrender with threats, not bloodshed.132 When official 
hostilities commenced between the Confederate States and the United States, the 
Confederates made all Union officers and soldiers in the Southern-supporting Texas POWs 
and put them on parole to effectively remove Union men from fighting prior to any actual 
battles.133  The Confederate officers clearly believed that these men would abide by their 
paroles as they  employed very  little force in making the Union officers give their word of 
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honour. Furthermore, the fact that parole was accepted by both sides means that on the 
issue of POWs, both the North and the South treated the other as a belligerent state. 
 
 The paroles signed in Texas caused some confusion for the Union. De Witt C. Peters, 
an Assistant Surgeon of the Union army, travelled all the way from Texas to Richmond 
(Virginia) in the hope of being exchanged after signing a parole. He wrote to Adjutant-
General L. Thomas that “[n]ot knowing in what light these paroles are to be treated I 
respectfully  await the orders of the Secretary  of War.”134  Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Reeve 
was much more decisive on what being on parole meant. When he received a letter asking 
for him to report for duty in Scarsdale, West Chester County (New York), he wrote back:
I inclose herewith a copy of my parole, supposing the Adjutant-General may 
have forgotten its terms. It most positively  forbids me from doing the duties 
to which I am ordered, and I do not see how it is possible to enter upon them 
or any other duties which will either directly or indirectly operate to the 
prejudice of the Confederate States or the rebel cause without a violation of 
my honor.135
Considering that at  the time no man could have predicted the absolute carnage of the years 
ahead, and that  no real battles had taken place at this point, Reeve’s reasons for refusing to 
report for duty were not likely  due to self-preservation, fear or war-fatigue. Undoubtedly, 
Reeve was being sincere when he said that he could not take any course of action that 
might violate his honour. 
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 Reeve’s dedication to personal honour was given further credence in his dealings 
with the Union Secretary of War. The Lincoln administration was, understandably, not 
happy about the events in Texas. The Republican newspaper, The National Republican, for 
example, published an article stating “by the surrender of that department, the Government 
has lost and the rebel cause gained naval, military, and commercial advantages beyond the 
power of money  to estimate, or language to express.”136  Though the language used was 
somewhat hyperbolic, the validity  of the paroles signed in San Antonio, which the 
newspaper New York Courier and Enquirer argued were “extorted, and in violation of a 
compact”, was called into question by some Union officials.137 Upon hearing that Colonel 
Reeve would not resume his duty, Simon Cameron, the Union Secretary of War, wrote to 
his department: “I acknowledge the receipt of the letter of Col. I.V.D. Reeve referred by 
you to this Department. You will give the required instructions to have your orders 
executed, and if Lieutenant-Colonel Reeve does not comply with them he must either 
resign or have his name stricken from the rolls.”138Even with this threat of dismissal, 
Reeve replied “I still deemed the duty above referred to as incompatible with my parole, 
but not wishing to give so strict a construction to its terms as to render myself liable to a 
charge of wishing to avoid such duties...I referred the matter to the President”.139 
Lieutenant-Colonel Reeve went on to state that the President “approves my construction of 
the parole in relation to what duties as are consistent with my parole. I am willing and 
anxious to do such duties... but these are very limited.”140After this, Reeve was saved from 
any more challenges to his word of honour. Union officials did not force the officers and 
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soldiers to undermine their parole. Informal exchanges between the Union and Confederate 
armies could subsequently be carried out.141  Reeve was formally released from the terms 
of his parole through an exchange in January  1862.142  Throughout this whole ordeal, it is 
clear that Reeve placed a great deal of importance on his ‘word of honour’. 
 The paroles signed in the early years of the war followed a general pattern. Officers 
were entitled to give their ‘word of honour’ and the soldiers gave their ‘oath’. First Infantry 
Captain E.D. Phillips of the Union army, being a commissioned officer, signed a parole 
stating: “I give my word of honor as an officer and a gentlemen that I will not bear arms 
nor exercise any of the functions of my office under any commission from the President  of 
the United States against the Confederate States of America...unless I shall be 
exchanged”.143  The parole went on to state that Phillips could also return to duty if the 
President of the Confederate States released him from his parole and that he could “go and 
come wherever I may see fit”.144   After a Union victory in 1861, several Confederate 
officers  took the parole: “We and each of us for himself severally pledge our words of 
honor as officers and gentlemen that we will not again take up arms against the United 
States...until regularly discharged according to the usages of war from this obligation.”145 
The paroles for soldiers followed a similar format but with the obvious change that they 
were giving their oath, not their word:
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We do solemnly swear that  we will not bear arms against the Confederate 
States of America, nor in any way give aid and comfort to the United States 
against the Confederate States, unless we shall be duly  exchanged for other 
prisoners of war, or until we shall be released by the President of the 
Confederate States. In consideration of this oath, it is understood that we are 
free to go wherever we may see fit.146
Distinguishing an officer’s parole from that of a soldier’s suggests that officers were 
viewed as having a higher level of honour than the men they commanded. This ties in well 
with the European understanding of parole d’honneur whereby an officer, according to 
historian Michael Lewis, was a gentleman and therefore his word of honour could be 
trusted.147 However, in the American case, soldiers were entitled to the same privileges as 
officers. The only difference between the paroles was the use of “oath” and “word of 
honor”. The honour expected from an officer was therefore being extended to the volunteer 
or non-military trained soldier. Yet the honour of the military trained officer was the ideal. 
As in the case of Reeve, parole was expected to work because an ‘honourable’ man would 
not take any course of action that might jeopardise his personal honour. As America did not 
have an aristocracy or a hereditary social hierarchy (in which honour was simply 
assumed), the ideal military ‘gentleman’ was defined mainly by his education, conduct and 
respectability. 
 Honour in antebellum America was a way of regulating ‘respectable’ conduct. The 
1857 edition of Webster’s American Dictionary of the English Language provided quite a 
44
146 OR, Series 2, Volume 1, p. 51. 
147 Lewis, Napoleon and his British Captives, 44. 
lengthy definition of the term.148 In regards to having personal honour, the concept was the 
“esteem due or paid to worth” which was linked to “[d]ignity; exalted rank or place; 
distinction; fame”. Honour also consisted of “reputation” and a “good name” and could 
require “[t]rue nobleness of mind; magnanimity...An assumed appearance of nobleness; 
scorn of meanness, springing from the fear of reproach, without regard to principle.” 
Virtues divided along gender lines, such as “bravery in men” and “chastity  in females” 
were further linked to honour.149  Acts of honour, such as giving one’s word or following 
the code of honour were defined: “On or upon my honor, words accompanying a 
declaration which pledge one’s honor or reputation for the truth of it—Laws of honor, 
certain rules and regulations, which prevail in fashionable society, requiring the strictest 
attention to outward conduct, and yet allowing the most flagrant breaches of moral 
rectitude.”150  A key element in these definitions is the idea that honour required outward 
displays of conduct deemed honourable or respectable. Maintaining a “good name” was 
important and to pledge one’s honour was to put that “good name” to the test. As the 
definition of the “laws of honor” suggests, honour in antebellum America was 
differentiated from internal morality or conscience. Though honour could be linked to 
virtues such as dignity, magnanimity  and nobleness, as the last definition made clear, 
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outward displays of honourable conduct could be expected even if it did not coincide with 
an individual’s morals. Honour was about appearance. 
 Letters between officers throughout the American Civil War used the word “honor” 
in abundance. Phrases like “on my honor”, “it  is my honor” and “with honor” were part of 
the polite parlance of the time.151  Though these may seem to be mere figures of speech, 
they  took on real importance in a military context. Francis Lieber, the German-born, 
Napoleonic and Greek Revolution war veteran, who taught in South Carolina College 
before becoming an ardent Union supporter at the outbreak of the Civil War, noted the 
important connection between an officer and a gentleman in one of his popular 
publications.152 In 1846, he dedicated a whole lecture to the students of Miami University, 
Ohio, on the ‘character of the gentleman’.153 His lecture was extended and published into a 
121 page book, which garnered favaourable reviews in popular Southern publications, such 
as The Southern Quarterly Review and remained in circulation throughout the North until 
1864.154 Lieber suggested that gentlemanly conduct for an officer in the army or navy was 
essential: 
 [A]n officer of the army  or navy may be tried for “conduct unbecoming a 
gentleman,”—a charge ruinous to his career, if the court pronounces him 
guilty; “on the word of a gentleman,” is considered among men of character 
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equivalent to a solemn asseveration, and the charge “he is no gentleman,” as 
one of the most degrading that can be brought against a man of education.155 
In this passage, Lieber is referring to the American Articles of War which outlined and 
defined the expected conduct of officers and soldiers. As Lieber suggested, the officer was 
expected to behave as a gentleman; indeed, it was an integral part of his profession. 
 
 The Articles of War were primarily a guideline for discipline in the army. They 
provide a key insight into American military culture and a crucial link in examining how 
civilian values influence and shape a nation’s military. Prior to the Civil War, the American 
articles of war went through four revisions.156  These articles covered everything from 
enlistment, how officers and soldiers were to behave within the army, the proper 
relationship  between soldier and civilian and the manner in which courts-martial were to 
be carried out. The Second Continental Congress enacted the first set  of articles in 1775, 
using the British Articles of War as their basis.157 
 
 Importantly, both the Union army and the Confederate army referred to the same 
Articles of War. The Union and the Confederacy  used the 1806 articles of war in their 
armies. The North placed the ‘Articles of War of 1806’ in the appendix of the Revised 
Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1861 stating, “[t]hese rules and 
articles...remain unaltered and in force at present.”158  In March 1861, the Confederacy 
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published and issued the ‘Confederate Articles of War’.159  These articles were exactly  the 
same as the 1806 American Articles of War with the distinction that “United States of 
America” was replaced with “Confederate States of America”.160  The effectiveness of 
these articles in maintaining discipline, however, was somewhat limited.161  As noted by 
numerous scholars, Civil War armies were mainly comprised of volunteers with little or no 
experience with military discipline.162  This made the task of enforcing discipline very 
difficult. A select few commissioned officers, nearly all trained at the military  academy 
West Point, led the untrained volunteers of both the North and the South into battle.163 
While an education at West Point during the antebellum years was not solely aimed at 
instilling military skills (there was a strong emphasis on engineering and liberal arts in the 
curriculum) the officers that graduated from the academy had a firm understanding of the 
type of conduct expected from an officer.164  John William French, a professor at West 
Point, also published his lecture Law and Military Law, which dealt with the international 
laws of war, in 1861.165  Graduates of West Point, consequently, were very likely educated 
in the laws of war. Significantly then, given that Civil War officers from both sides were 
trained at West Point and followed the same articles of war, both the Union and the 
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Confederacy had a very  similar ideal of conduct becoming an officer and a gentleman at 
the start of the war.
 Similar to the way ‘oath’ and ‘word of a gentleman’ was differentiated in paroles, the 
expected conduct of an officer and a soldier was clearly marked in the Articles of War. 
Nevertheless, again like the paroles, honour was still assumed to be held by  both officers 
and soldiers. The most obvious difference was admission into the army. Officers who 
commanded troops were “commissioned” which meant that their government conferred 
military authority to them based on the recommendation and endorsement of other 
officials.166 While not necessarily  linked to an aristocratic conception of honour, these men 
still had a reputation and good name to maintain based on the recommendation and 
acknowledgement of their peers. Soldiers enlisted. Article 10 required all “non-
commissioned officer[s] or soldier[s]” to take the “following oath or affirmation: I, A.B., 
do solemnly swear, or affirm (as the case may be), that  I will bear true allegiance to the 
United States of America [or Confederate States of America], that I will serve them 
honestly  and faithfully against all enemies or opposers whatsoever”.167  The paroles 
followed a similar format, but  with the difference that soldiers were swearing that they 
would not oppose the enemy until exchanged. To give an oath simply meant making “an 
appeal to God for the truth of what  is affirmed.”168  There was clearly  honour in taking an 
oath because, in essence, the men were saying that  they would be true to their word under 
God. However, an officer could give his ‘word of honour’ because to become an officer a 
man had to demonstrate his merit, be held in esteem by officials and maintain a good 
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reputation. In theory, if a soldier broke his oath, he would be breaking his word before 
God. If an officer broke his word, he would be shamed and lose his status among his peers. 
 Notwithstanding the formal mechanisms prescribing military  honour, the values of 
nineteenth-century American society were present in its military. The American Articles of 
War, for example, illustrate that there was an honour culture in America during the 
Victorian era in the way they sought to regulate the illegal practice of duelling, the type of 
punishment they  employed and the expected behaviour of men during a courts-martial.169 
All men who entered the military service were expected to behave in a respectful and 
Godly manner. The second and third articles, for example, “earnestly recommended to all 
officers and soldiers diligently  to attend divine service” and any use of profanities incurred 
a fine and forfeit of pay.170  An honour culture is most overtly  indicated by the articles 
relating to duelling. Articles 24 to 28 covered all aspects on duelling and insults. The duel, 
or ‘affairs of honour’, was a product of honour culture as it worked on the premise of both 
honour and its antithesis, shame.171  If a white gentleman was insulted or accused of 
falsehood, he had a right to seek redress and re-establish his reputation through the 
ritualised performance of the duel.172  If his opponent refused to fight, he was publicly 
shamed.173 Given the sensitivity  of some men to ‘insults’ and the risk of death and disorder 
in the ranks, the Articles of War sought to ban all aspects of ‘affairs of honour’. Offensive 
gestures and provoking speeches were not to be used and officers and soldiers were 
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forbidden to send or accept challenges for duels.174  The very fact that men were prone to 
duelling is evidence of soldiers and officers being highly  concerned with their personal 
honour.175  The duel was a deadly performance enacted to maintain a gentleman’s good 
name. 
 Officers and soldiers may have been banned from shaming or insulting each other 
with charges of cowardice or deceit, but in the Articles of War, military disciple employed 
‘honour and shame’ in  its punishment for officers. Article 85, for example, stated:
In all cases where a commissioned officer is cashiered for cowardice or 
fraud, it shall be added in the sentence that the crime, name, and place of 
abode, and punishment of the delinquent, be published in the newspapers in 
and about the camp, and the particular State from which the offender came, 
or where he usually resides: after which it shall be deemed scandalous for an 
officer to associate with him.176
Similar then, to the type of public shame suffered by a gentleman who refused to duel in 
civilian life, public disgrace was threatened as a punishment for both Northern and 
Southern officers. This is complemented by the language employed in Article 83: “Any 
commissioned officer convicted before a general court-martial of conduct unbecoming an 
officer and a gentleman, shall be dismissed from the service.”177  Nineteenth-century 
military discipline therefore expected men to behave bravely, have faith in God, and be 
respectful and honest. These virtues could easily  stand independently from the wider 
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concept of nineteenth-century  honour.  As the articles present the need to stop duelling and 
personal insults between soldiers, however, in addition to the use of publicly shaming an 
officer for cowardice and fraud, personal honour was clearly significant for American 
officers. It was part of what defined him.  
 This regard and common understanding of the worth placed on a gentleman’s 
personal honour was occasionally  reflected in the wording of paroles.  In the border state 
of Missouri, where loyalty for the Union and Confederacy  was divided, Union soldiers 
made Confederates sign a parole after they were defeated in May  1861.178  At first, the 
Missouri militia declined parole “on ground that to take oath would imply that they had 
been in arms against U.S. authorities which they [denied].”179  The staff and regimental 
officers did eventually pledge their “words as gentlemen” that  they  would not take up  arms 
against the United States. It appears that the Union officers were sensitive to the 
Confederate POW’s personal honour as the parole they signed ended with the stipulation: 
“While we sign this parole with a full intention of observing it, we nevertheless protest 
against the injustice of its exactions.”180  Consequently, in this instance, the POWs did not 
have to admit  that they were in the wrong, but they still gave their word of honour not to 
act in any way  against  the Union. The Northern soldiers still achieved the desired outcome 
of ensuring that the Confederate officers would not fight until exchanged, but seemingly 
understood that to accuse the men of falsehood could be perceived as impudent and a 
challenge to their personal honour. The Confederate officers therefore could formally 
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register their belief that the paroles were unjust while stating that they  would honour them 
regardless. 
 The adherence to personal honour and the belief that a man’s word could be trusted, 
were in theory, at the heart of parole. The officer exemplified this in his position and 
honour and shame were used as a way to regulate behaviour and conduct in the military. In 
the American Civil War this honour was extended to all white soldiers, as will be examined 
in more detail in the next chapter, but the American military officer was most  closely 
linked to the traditional understanding and use of parole. The behaviour outlined in the 
Articles of War, was of course, the ideal. More than a gentleman’s word of honour was at 
stake in the parole system. Parole provided an easy and inexpensive way for warring 
governments to ensure POWs would not fight, threats of retaliation for mistreated 
prisoners were taken seriously and the use of parole signaled to other nations and the 
enemy a dedication to humanity  in war.181  Furthermore, as the Civil War descended into 
carnage, personal honour was probably  not the only incentive for men to keep to the terms 
of their parole. Despite all this, parole still worked on the assumption that one’s opponents 
were honourable. 
 Given the North and the South’s esteem for honour and a similar conception of a 
military gentleman, paroles were recognised as legitimate and important from the first 
gunshots of the war. Officers, such as Lieutenant-Colonel Reeve, who were asked back 
into service after the Texas surrender refused, on the basis that it would violate their 
personal honour. International law inspired the practice of parole and provided the 
framework for its employment in conflict. As the First Chapter discussed, the idea that 
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governments who forced their soldiers to undermine paroles gave evidence of semi-
barbarism provided a strong incentive for the Lincoln administration to allow paroles to be 
honoured even when the status of the Confederacy  remained subject  to debate. The 
difference between ‘word’ and ‘oath’ in paroles indicates that the practice was 
distinguished by a military  hierarchy, but the concept of honour underpinned both the 
officer’s word and the soldier’s oath. 
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Chapter III
HONOUR ON A GRAND SCALE
The Ideal and the Reality of Parole in the American Civil War
 The ‘officer and gentleman’ was traditionally linked to the practice of parole, but  in 
the American Civil War, the soldiers he commanded were also entitled to the privilege. 
Military parole was a product of European international law, but as it operated on 
assumptions of ‘honour’ it could be changed and molded to a society’s understanding of 
that cultural construct. In the American Civil War, a conflict fought predominantly  by 
volunteers, the brave and virtuous ‘citizen-soldiers’ defending the cause of the Union or the 
Confederacy were also considered honourable. 
 At the start of the war, parole was used as a propaganda tool to measure and gauge 
the ‘dishonour’ of the enemy  while reasserting the honour of one’s own troops. Similar to 
the expectations for the ‘officer and the gentleman’, in the beginning of the Civil War the 
‘honour’ of the enlisted soldier was measured by his ability to abide by  the terms of his 
oath. However, as the fighting progressed, this idea, and the belief that all white soldiers 
were gentlemen when it came to parole, was fundamentally challenged. The American 
Civil War was immense. Huge, cumbersome armies fighting against each other resulted in 
the large-scale paroling of thousands of men. The logistical and administrative dimension 
to the parole system was subsequently  placed under considerable strain. The use of parole 
in promoting the honour of troops diminished, and in its place were suggestions that the 
parole system was being abused both by those in power and by dishonourable men skirting 
their military duties.  In 1863, the Lincoln administration issued two General Orders which 
sought to limit paroles by returning to the traditional idea that only commissioned officers 
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were entitled to the practice.182  This chapter will examine the uniquely American way 
parole was employed during the Civil War and how the conflict  itself challenged previous 
beliefs on this ‘honourable and humane’ POW system. 
 
 As the previous two chapters have argued, parole was as much a product of cultural 
assumptions within nations as it was a logical system of looking after prisoners. An 
understanding of international law and a conscious and public effort to follow the laws of 
war, highlighted to the rest of the world the ‘civilised’ character of the state. Paroles could 
also be signed and honoured in armies, provided that both sides recognised honour in the 
other, regardless of whether there were any official policies to regulate behaviour. Parole 
was an individual act based on personal honour as opposed to patriotic fervour. 
Governments could, of course, force paroled men to fight on threat of dismissal or even 
death, but in Europe and America such an act was regarded as uncivilised. Yet towards the 
end of the Civil War the practice of parole was largely disregarded by government and 
military officials.183  After 1863 there were still informal instances of parole, but the 
practice, for the most part, all but ceased; it was only given a reprise at  the conclusion of 
the war in 1865, when the Union allowed honour in defeat for the Confederate armies by 
offering paroles of honour upon surrender, in lieu of punishments for rebellion.184 
Certainly  after Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, which came into effect in January 
1863, relations and discussions on the fate of POWs between the North and the South 
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broke-down.185 The Emancipation Proclamation essentially  stated that all slaves were free, 
and allowed African Americans to fight for the Union.186  Not surprisingly, the South, 
fearful of an uprising by their slave population and adamant that black troops were not 
legitimate soldiers, did not take kindly  to Lincoln’s decision.187  Still by 1862, the same 
year the General Exchange Cartel was established, there was a growing disillusionment 
with the practice of parole. Despite the honour cultures in nineteenth-century America 
supporting the system’s operation and its sanction under international law, by  1863 parole 
was no longer viewed as a viable POW practice.
 One compelling reason for the changing conceptions on parole was the changing 
nature of warfare. As stated in the First Chapter, international law was as much an 
intellectual debate as it  was an international system to regulate state behaviour. As state 
practice defined international law, theories on the laws of war could sometimes be out of 
sync with the realities of warfare. At the dawn of the nineteenth century the practice of 
parole had already started its demise in European warfare. The two nations that  Vattel had 
once commended for their use of the practice, Britain and France, were struggling to 
maintain a reciprocal parole system during the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815).188  As 
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historian Michael Lewis notes, this was more so the fault of the French than the British.189 
The French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars had uprooted the traditional eighteenth-
century style of warfare and definition of an officer and a soldier.190  Huge national armies 
were not a common feature of eighteenth-century wars and the distinction that only 
aristocratic officers could give their parole meant that the practice was naturally  limited.191 
The French Revolution challenged this. Much more emphasis was placed on the national 
dimensions of warfare, particularly  during the Napoleonic Wars.192  The famous Prussian 
military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz noted the new nationalistic fervour that permeated 
the Napoleonic Wars when he discussed the ‘character of contemporary warfare’: “All 
these cases have shown what an enormous contribution the heart and temper of a nation 
can make to the sum total of its politics, war potential, and fighting strength.”193  In other 
words, a state’s ability to wage war was enhanced by the nationalistic sentiment of its 
people. France, in particular, embraced the citizen-soldier because with Déclaration des 
droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen (1789) the ‘French citizen’ was created.194 The rise of the 
humble Corsican Napoleon Bonaparte to Emperor of France loudly proclaimed the fall of 
the ancien regime and the aristocratic conception of honour.195  Parole was still employed 
during the Napoleonic Wars, but  with less regularity and regard for the practice among 
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French soldiers.196  Parole thus faded in Europe as the nature of European armies and 
warfare changed.
 A similar argument can be made for the American Civil War. The Americans 
embraced parole because, despite a striking blow to the practice in Europe, military  parole 
was still promoted in the nineteenth-century  international legal textbooks and state rhetoric 
as being an honourable and humane POW practice. Indeed, the international Hague 
Convention of 1899 codified parole in its treaty on the ‘Laws and Customs of War of 
Land’.197 This was done despite the fact that the American Civil War was the last western 
conflict where parole was regularly  employed by  both sides and honoured by both 
armies.198  Ideals of international law could still be promoted even if they were not 
practiced. As the American Civil War was one of the bloodiest conflicts of the nineteenth 
century, costing over 620,000 American lives, with technological improvements in 
weaponry and transport and strong nationalistic dimensions, parole may have simply  lost 
relevance in America, as it did in the Napoleonic Wars.199  Nevertheless, such an 
explanation ignores a fundamental difference between the two conflicts. Whereas in 
France, the fall of the aristocracy led to a disregard for the aristocratic practice of parole, in 
the American Civil War, parole was incorporated into arguments about the ‘honour of the 
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nation’ and its soldiers. The Americans started from the assumption that all white citizen-
soldiers had honour and were entitled to give their ‘oath of honour’ if made a POW. 
 All white soldiers, in both the Confederate and Union armies were entitled to parole, 
regardless of rank or social class. The only  group absolutely excluded from the practice 
were African Americans. As an article in the abolitionist newspaper Douglass’ Monthly 
made clear in 1861, “[t]he idea of sending free negroes through here on a parole of honor 
was ridiculous”.200  For white soldiers, the idea of receiving a ‘parole of honour’ was 
expected. While there was a distinction between officers and soldiers, the white volunteer 
or citizen-soldier was highly esteemed in American society. Henry Wager Halleck 
addressed the common assumptions antebellum Americans held on warfare in his 
influential textbook, Elements of Military Art and Science (first published in 1846 and 
republished in 1861 and 1862). Halleck felt  the need to dedicate a whole chapter to the 
importance of military education as a way to refute the arguments put forth by critics of 
West Point. One prominent criticism, inspired by America’s history, was:
It has been alleged by many opponents of the West Point Academy, that 
military instruction is of little or no advantage to a general; —that in the 
wars of Napoleon, and in the American Revolution, and the American 
War of 1812, armies were generally  led to victory by men without a 
military education, and unacquainted with military science; —and in the 
event of another war in this country, we must seek our generals in the 
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ranks of civil life, rather than among the graduates of our Military 
Academy.201
Being a graduate of West Point himself, and an officer in the United States Army, Halleck 
denied that civilians alone could defend the country “however intelligent, patriotic, and 
brave they  may  be.”202  The Lincoln and Davis administrations shared Halleck’s sentiments 
as they commissioned graduates of West Point as their officers.203  Still, newspapers and 
popular opinion highly praised and rallied around the citizen-soldier. The South Carolina 
newspaper the Charleston Daily, for example, waxed eloquent: “Doth it not make the heart 
rejoice to hear of those volunteers...encounter the dangers of war, the pestilence of 
camp...yet each man determined upon winning a patriot’s grave or living the life of a 
sovereign freeman?”204  At the start of the Civil War, the examples of virtuous and 
dedicated citizen-soldiers defending their freedom and way of life must have been 
especially appealing to Americans who viewed themselves as fighting to maintain the 
Union or seceding to establish their independence.
 The honour traditionally reserved for the officer was therefore extended to the 
common soldier in the early  years of the Civil War. Given that Civil War armies were 
predominantly made up of volunteers, the paroling of citizen-soldiers, in many  ways, could 
hardly  be otherwise.205  America was a democracy, and while the majority of soldiers may 
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not have been familiar with military discipline, they were concerned with their rights.206 
According to historian Bruce Tap, West Point  had the reputation in antebellum America of 
being “elitist”.207  Many of the graduates came from prominent, wealthy American families 
who supposedly  made their way  through life based on their influence as opposed to their 
merit.208  The idea of a professional, standing army  also had a decidedly “Old World” 
feeling to many Americans.209  Furthermore, in civilian life, nineteenth-century Americans 
did not ascribe honour solely  to military officers. The nineteenth-century  Confederate or 
Union officer was not aristocratic and honour was based on the recognition and esteem of 
one’s peers—applicable, albeit in different ways, to any social class. In both the Union and 
Confederate armies, soldiers from a variety  of backgrounds were concerned with their 
personal honour.210 The need to address the practice of duelling in the Articles of War, for 
example, was testament to a wider honour culture among nineteenth-century American 
men. As a result, the privilege of parole could not be given to the wealthy officer but 
denied to brave, honourable and patriotic men he commanded. 
 In a war where the integrity and legitimacy of the nation was paramount for both 
sides, the honour of one’s soldiers was very important. Both ‘nations’ were also working 
under the same framework of military honour as outlined by  the Articles of War. Somewhat 
paradoxically, the fact that military honour was seen as important for both the North and 
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the South, meant that newspapers on both sides used the early paroles to promote the 
honour of their troops by highlighting the dishonour of the enemy’s. Though critical of the 
Republican party and President Lincoln, the Northern newspaper Brooklyn Daily Eagle 
made it clear in September 1862 that the honour of soldiers reflected the honour of the 
nation: “No officer or private has the right while under parole to join his own or any other 
regiment. He might  be willing to take the risk of detection at the hands of the rebels, but he 
has no right to jeopard the honor of the nation.”211  Personal honour and the honour of the 
nation were therefore linked in this article. Abiding by  one’s word of honour was an 
integral attribute of the nineteenth-century gentleman. As the gentleman was fighting for 
the nation he was putting both his good name and that of the nation’s to the test when he 
pledged his parole. 
 The argument that officers and soldiers who broke parole ‘dishonoured’ themselves 
was strong at the start of the conflict. Upon hearing rumours that the Lincoln government 
might not recognise the paroles signed by  Union men at San Antonio, Texas, the secession-
supporting New Orleans newspaper the Daily Picayune argued that the Federal 
government “insists, as it appears, on enforcing its own immoral code upon its official 
subordinates” by forcing men to “dishonor themselves” by breaking parole.212  The 
argument that  ‘rebels’ had no honour was likewise articulated early in the Northern press. 
The moderately Republican and very large daily newspaper, the New York Times argued 
that the South had dishonoured themselves by seceding, stating “the idea of letting him [a 
Confederate soldier] off on a parole of honor is a delusion...there is no honor in a rebel.”213 
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The New York newspaper Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper in April 1862, argued that 
parole-breaking came naturally to the Confederates as “our foe is as unscrupulous as he is 
bloody and treacherous”.214  The article claimed: “We will venture the assertion that full 
half of the rebels whom Burnside parolled at Roanoke, he will be obliged to meet a second 
time in battle”.215  As these examples suggest, the dishonour of the enemy was exemplified 
by his failure to keep his word or oath. 
 Towards the end of 1862 it became apparent that  the honour spread over the entire 
Confederate and Union armies was perhaps spread too thin. Due to the size of American 
Civil War armies, the sheer number of men taking an oath that they would not fight until 
exchanged was immense. In the first year of the war, the Union had 575,917 soldiers and 
the Confederacy had around 326,768 soldiers fighting for their cause.216  Neither the 
government nor people in both the North and the South anticipated the conflict to be this 
massive.217  The confusing and bloody nature of Civil War battles saw many soldiers 
captured as POWs in the smoky aftermath.218  In 1861, after the surrender of Confederate 
General John Pegram to Union General George B. McClellan, McClellan found himself 
with 900 to 1,000 prisoners to take care of. In his letters to officials, he referred to the 
question of what to do with these prisoners as “embarrassing” and asked “[p]lease give me 
immediate instruction by telegraph as to the disposition to be made of officers and under 
men taken prisoner of war.”219  McClellan was instructed to allow the soldiers their oath 
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and the officers their ‘word of honour’.220  As the war continued, the number of paroled 
men increased. The Confederate victories in the Battle of Richmond, Kentucky (August 
29-30, 1862) and the Battle of Munfordville, Kentucky (September 14-17, 1862), for 
example, both resulted in the large-scale parole of roughly four-thousand Union soldiers.221 
After the battle of Vicksburg, Mississippi (July  4, 1863), a staggering thirty-thousand 
Confederate POWs were placed on parole.222 The traditional conception of parole, with its 
natural limitation to officers was therefore being extended to accommodate thousands of 
men.
 The simple mechanisms for keeping the parole system in operation started to 
collapse under its own weight. Keeping records of all the men paroled for future exchanges 
and subsequent reentry into the army would have been a daunting an almost 
insurmountable task. David L. Day, a soldier in the Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, 
recorded in his diary entry for the 18 February 1862: “The [Confederate] prisoners are all 
paroled, and were sent off today. Paroling the prisoners was rather interesting to lookers 
on. They were required to affix their autographs to the parole, and it was curious to observe 
that a large majority of them wrote it in the same way, simply  marking the letter X.”223  The 
need for clear records was vital for parole as it allowed the enemy to recognise men who 
broke their oath or word and it provided information for their own government on who 
could be exchanged and reenter the ranks of service. The marking of the ‘X’ by  the 
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Confederate soldiers on their paroles also suggests that the practice as a whole was 
fundamentally changing during the Civil War. Some white men in the South were illiterate 
during the Civil War era, especially  if they  came from poorer areas, but the majority  of 
enlisted men would have had some form of education.224 Whether the soldiers observed by 
Day really were illiterate, simply too lazy  or apathetic to sign their name or whether that 
aspect of the entry  was an embellishment, the ‘X’ still signifies the anonymity of the Civil 
War ‘soldier parole’. What was intended to be an individual act based on personal honour 
between two military  men was now a huge administrative endeavour. The personal honour 
that formed the basis of the parole system could get lost in the grand scale of oaths given 
by patriotic men. After the large-scale parole of Confederate POWs at Vicksburg, for 
example, Confederate Lieutenant-General E. Kirby Smith relayed an order “for all officers 
and soldiers paroled at Vicksburg and Port Hudson...to report to the various camps of 
instruction” as many of the prisoners paroled after the surrender had “yielded to the desire 
to visit  their homes” when they were not supposed to.225  The Confederacy blamed the 
Union for allowing them to “pass through their lines” and become “scattered far and 
wide”.226 
 In other words, the parole system was easy to abuse. With thousands of men paroled 
at once, the individual emphasis on ‘personal honour’ was undermined. The war had gone 
on for much longer than anticipated, the number of war dead went from thousands to tens 
of thousands and armies continually called for more men.227 The sheer scale of the war had 
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shrouded the common soldier in a cloak of anonymity. Both armies recognised this and 
sought to find justifications and loop-holes for disregarding soldiers’ oaths by getting men 
back into battle. Union Major-General Nathaniel Prentiss Banks, for example, wrote to 
Confederate General Richard Taylor in August 1863 “I have the honor to inform you that I 
have directed the immediate return to duty  of all prisoners paroles by you....My reasons for 
doing so are that the paroles were in violation of the cartel of exchange”.228  An article in 
the Southern, pro-Confederacy newspaper, The Charleston Mercury in July  1863, justified 
the government’s refusal to recognise “the paroles given to officers and soldiers captured 
by the Yankee forces under Sanders, in their recent raid in Tennessee” by claiming that the 
Union government had never recognised the paroles given to Union soldiers by guerrilla 
fighter Morgan.229  The personal honour of the men was not discussed in these two 
examples, and it appears that the idea that it was semi-barbaric or immoral to force paroled 
men to fight had lost most of its influence. Both sides still justified their actions, but 
practical considerations outweighed considerations of honour. 
 The use of large-scale paroles also profoundly affected the practice in another way. 
Whereas at the start of the conflict, the personal honour of the soldier was linked to the 
honour of the nation, by late 1862 and early  1863 criticism was directed towards the idea 
that paroles were preventing, or being deliberately used by soldiers to avoid, their military 
duty.  Desertion through parole became a problem for both Confederate and Union armies 
by late 1862.230  The nature of the war itself provided strong incentives to desert. The 
American Civil War was undoubtedly America’s bloodiest conflict, costing more lives, 
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according to historian James McPherson, than all of America’s “other wars combined 
through Vietnam”.231  Dead bodies accumulated both as a result  of the fighting and the 
diseases that flourished under the hardships of the war.232  Guerrilla warfare and irregular 
killings in the ‘border states’ (states loyal to the Union but divided within by loyal 
Northern and Southern supporters) also saw the level of violence escalate with mutilated 
corpses.233  The North, and particularly the South, began to feel the economic strain of the 
conflict as the war transformed into one of attrition.234  In the spring of 1862 conscription 
was employed by the Confederacy and the Lincoln administration issued their conscription 
act in March 1863.235  Men were no longer flocking to defend their cause and coercion was 
needed to fill the ranks. The large-scale use of paroles, in this context, became a 
convenient excuse for men who no loner wanted to fight. 
 A patriot could not defend his cause if he was placed on parole. As historian Paul 
Robinson suggests, by  the First World War, the ‘honour’ of the captured soldier had 
undergone a complete change. Both Britain and Germany “forbade their men from giving 
their paroles. After capture, a man was now expected to regain his honour by  trying to 
escape.”236  This was not yet  the case in the American Civil War soldier. Still, while 
keeping one’s oath or word was honourable, it became dishonourable if that oath was used 
to avoid military obligations. The Northern newspaper Chicago Tribune, a major Republic 
paper, published an article in February 1863 on 10,000 blank paroles printed by  a Union 
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general (referred to as “Gen. Gunspiker”) to be signed and handed to the Confederates 
prior to any  actual fighting. The article concluded with: “Gen. Gunspiker represents a too 
large class of men in the service, who are eager to find any enemy not to fight, but to 
parole them.”237  The satirical ‘Song of the Sneak’ was likewise published in the Northern 
magazine The Continental Monthly in December 1862. The song told the story of a group 
of Union soldiers only  too happy to be placed on parole: “When we won’t  have no more 
fighting...Yet in our pay delighting/ We can loaf at ease, all day/ And keep  clear of guns 
affrighting”.238  The song subverted the idea of paroles being honourable by suggesting that 
the men who signed them were cowards, given their desire to keep clear of “guns 
affrighting”, and dishonest as they  took pay while loafing “at ease, all day”. The song was 
preluded with the message: “Thousands and thousands ‘have taken the word’ and thereby 
incapacitated from taking further part in the war” the ‘Song of the Sneak’ was intended to 
awaken people to “the infamy which a ready surrender on parole conditions brings”.239 
These articles were referring to the dishonour of Union men by publications that were 
sympathetic to the Union cause. 
 There was justification in their complaints. Two Union POWs, after being asked back 
into the service, for example, informed their officer “we were taken prisoners at Lexington 
and there surrendered our arms to General Price of the Confederate Army. We there took a 
solemn oath before God and man that we would not  take up arms against the Southern 
Confederacy.”240  Accordingly, these men claimed that it was their “duty to stand by that 
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oath”.241  While this was admirable, they also insisted “we do not think that an exchange 
will relieve us from that oath....The officers of this regiment can return to service with a 
clear conscience as they did not take an oath but were released on a parole of honor and 
have been exchanged.”242  Not being able to get men back into the army  would have been 
just as problematic for the parole system as soldier’s breaking their oath. The argument put 
forth by  these two men was perhaps even more insidious than breaking one’s oath by 
fighting again for the nation’s cause. They  were using the pretext  of an ‘honourable 
obligation’ to the terms of their oath as a way to avoid their obligations to the army. There 
was a fine line between honourable and dishonourable uses of parole. 
 General Orders No. 49 and General Orders No. 100 issued by the Union, sought to 
limit the use of parole by returning to the traditional European idea that only 
commissioned officers were entitled to the practice. General Orders No. 49, published in 
February 1863, made it clear that “[n]one but commissioned officers can give the parole 
for themselves or their commands, and no inferior officer can give a parole without the 
authority of his superior within reach.”243  Non-commissioned officers or privates could not 
give their parole “except through an officer” and “[i]ndividual paroles not given through an 
officer are not only void but subject the individuals giving them to the punishment of death 
as deserters”.244  General Orders No. 49 therefore made it unambiguously clear that 
common soldiers giving their oath that they would not oppose the enemy would no longer 
be tolerated—on threat of a dishonourable death. General Orders No. 100, published two 
months later, stated that release “of prisoners of war by  exchange is the general rule; 
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release by parole the exception”.245  Additionally, both documents stated that there was to 
be “[n]o paroling on the battle-field; no paroling of entire bodies of troops after a battle; 
and no dismissal of large numbers of prisoners, with a general declaration that they are 
paroled is permitted, or of any  value.”246  This was less than a year after the 1862 General 
Exchange Cartel stated that all prisoners, of whatever rank, were to be paroled or 
exchanged within ten days of their capture.
 As outlined in the Second Chapter, the idea that only officers could give parole was 
the common practice in eighteenth-century and early  nineteenth-century Europe. Francis 
Lieber, a German immigrant with military experience in the Battle of Waterloo and the 
Greek Revolution, was the main author of General Orders No. 100 and was well educated 
in international law.247  Emmerich de Vattel and other prominent international legal 
theorists had always maintained the distinction that parole was generally reserved for 
officers—General Orders No. 49 and 100 were consequently  not creating a new use for 
parole but rather were reaffirming the traditional idea. 
 This did not stop the Confederate government, however, from objecting to the 
Union’s departure from the terms agreed upon in the 1862 Cartel. The Confederate 
Secretary of War James A. Seddon, upon receiving notice that General Orders No. 100 was 
to serve as the basis for military  practices between the North and the South objected “to the 
claim of the United States to determine under when or what circumstances the parole of a 
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prisoner may take place.”248  Seddon even accused Lieber of being “one much more 
familiar with the decrees of the imperial despotisms of the continent of Europe than with 
Magna Charta, the Petition of Rights, the Bill of Rights, the Declaration of Independence, 
and the Constitution of the United State.”249  Seddon’s language made it  very  clear that the 
idea of changing the parole system back to its traditional use was ‘un-American’. The 
Lincoln administration, however, remained firm in their stance on paroles, and while the 
Confederacy complained about the change to the Cartel agreement, large-scale paroles 
were problematic for Confederate armies too.250  
 The Davis administration did not waver in their stance, at least  in rhetoric, that they 
could employ large-scale paroles against  their enemy.251  If paroles ceased, then the 
principles of honour and humanity  in international law dictated that prisoners were to be 
well-fed and comfortably defined at  the captor government’s expense. This posed a 
problem for the poorly prepared and financially drained Confederate States.252 
Nevertheless, according to historian Mark A. Weitz, desertion through parole was a key 
problem for Confederate armies, exacerbated by the fact that  Southerners in 1863 were 
fighting what now seemed to be a losing war.253 As desperate, sometimes starving family 
members appealed to their male relatives for help, and as Confederate rations dwindled, 
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returning home was increasingly tempting for Confederate soldiers.254  Any potential 
agreements or new mutually agreed upon POW policies were also out of the question once 
the Emancipation Proclamation forced the Confederacy to face its own racial fears. By 
placing black Union soldiers “outside the protections of honour and humanity” relations 
between the North and South broke down and paroles, for the most part, ceased.255  The 
Emancipation Proclamation, however, was simply the final nail in the coffin. The parole 
system had been faltering since late 1862. The personal honour that formed the basis of the 
practice of parole became dissipated in the immense wave of ‘patriots’ taking an oath that 
they would not fight until exchanged. 
 In the American Civil War, the practice of allowing all white soldiers the privilege of 
parole was crushed by  the sheer number of men giving their oath. What was generally 
conceptualised by international legal theorists as a limited POW practice between officers, 
was stretched to facilitate thousands of men. At the start of the conflict, parole was used to 
highlight the honour of one section’s soldiers by  arguing for the dishonour of the other 
army. International law served as the framework for POW policies, and the honour 
traditionally  reserved for the commissioned officer, was extended to the men he 
commanded in compliance with America’s democratic character. As the conflict continued, 
however, large-scale paroling garnered criticism for its logistical problems and an attempt 
was made by the Union to return to the traditional practice of paroling only commissioned 
officers. The parole system was under considerable strain by 1863 and with the 
Emancipation Proclamation communications and reciprocal efforts to fix the system were 
not carried out. Still, prior to the Emancipation Proclamation, the pledging and keeping to 
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one’s word of honour was no longer linked to the honour of the nation. A patriot could not 
defend his cause if he was placed on parole. In linking the ‘honourable’ practice of parole 
to the ‘dishonourable’ act of desertion it  is clear that there was a general disillusionment 
with the system, particularly in the North, mid-way through the conflict. The ideal of 
military honour did not completely  fade in this period, but the personal honour and 
individual act of pledging one’s word or oath was increasingly lost in the grand scale of the 
American Civil War. 
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CONCLUSION 
 On the 9th of April 1865, at the Appomattox Court House, Virginia, Confederate 
General Robert  E. Lee signed the most important parole of the American Civil War. Lee 
and his men pledged to Union Lieutenant General Ulysses Grant that they “do hereby give 
our solemn parole of honor that we will not hereafter serve in the armies of the 
Confederate States, or in any  military capacity  whatever, against the United States of 
America.”256  The Confederate armies issued the first  paroles of the American Civil War 
and the Union issued the paroles that concluded the four years of carnage. 
 The parole signed by  Confederate General Robert E. Lee suggests that the ideals of 
military honour and humanity made it through the conflict. However, they  did not make it 
through unscathed. The paroles signed at the conclusion of the American Civil War were a 
reprieve of a practice that largely ceased in 1863. The concept of nineteenth-century 
military honour, exemplified by the practice of parole, was severely challenged throughout 
the course of the American Civil War. 
 At the start of the war, the parole system was quickly and naturally adopted by  the 
two armies. Both Northern and Southern soldiers recognised honour in the other and 
trusted their enemy to keep his word. The use of parole in the early years of the conflict 
demonstrates that nineteenth-century American military institutions were engaged with, 
and promoted, European tenants of international law and ‘gentlemanly’ conduct in warfare. 
Both the Confederate and Union governments wished to be viewed as ‘honourable’ nations 
in an international context. The honour cultures that permeated both Northern and 
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Southern societies and found expression in the 1806 Articles of War, provided the basis for 
the practice of parole in the American Civil War. Pledging one’s word or oath was a serious 
business in a society where the concepts of honour and shame were used to regulate 
respectable conduct. In the community of nations, the distinction between ‘savage’ and 
‘civilised’ modes of warfare provided a strong incentive for the newly declared 
Confederate States of America to issue paroles and for the initially wary Union to accept 
and reciprocate the practice. The use of parole was even incorporated into the larger 
debates about the righteousness of both sides’ ‘cause’ and the honour of Union and 
Confederate soldiers. 
 By taking military parole out of the broader narrative of Civil War POW policies and 
placing it within the context of a nineteenth-century understanding of military ‘honour’, it 
is possible to examine the way in which Civil War armies interpreted the practice of parole 
and the implications this had on its use. In compliance with the democratic character of 
American society and the esteem held for the dedicated, volunteer citizen-soldier, the 
privilege of parole was permissible for all ranks of white conventional soldiers. By 
extending the privilege of parole to all soldiers in a war on the scale of the American Civil 
War, the personal honour that formed the basis of the practice began to dissolve.  
 Military parole worked best in a world where men who dishonoured their word 
would be found out and shamed. As honour was about appearance, the pledging of one’s 
word or oath was done not only for the individual himself but for his audience. On a 
limited scale, the laws of honour were easier to observe and wielded more influence 
because of man’s ‘good name’ or personal honour was more pronounced. In the American 
Civil War, as enlistments rapidly increased and the number of dead soldiers went  from 
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thousands to tens of thousands, the individual soldier became increasingly anonymous. He 
was just one in thousands who pledged his oath and then waited for instructions on what 
was expected of him next. 
 As the nature of the Civil War itself took on a more brutal and less ‘honourable’ 
character, the problem of desertion through paroles warranted official attention. The 
anonymity brought about by the use of large-scale paroles, meant that the parole system 
was easy to abuse. Due to war weariness and the unexpected longevity  of the conflict, by 
1863 both the North and the South were using conscription to help fill their ranks. Around 
this time a changing public perception regarding the ‘honourable’ nature of paroles was 
discernible, particularly in the North. The idea that keeping one’s word was always 
honourable was replaced with the criticism that men were using their ‘oath’ or ‘word of 
honour’ to avoid their duties to the nation. Using parole solely to avoid military  obligations 
was cowardly, not honourable. As suggested by the two General Orders issued by the 
Lincoln administration in 1863, mid-way through the conflict there was a general 
disillusionment with parole. By  extending the practice of parole to all white soldiers in a 
large and brutal war, the word of an officer and the oath of a patriot  was transformed from 
an idealised and highly esteemed display of military honour, to a military anachronism. 
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